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I. 
JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee does not dispute the statement of facts submitted by the Appellant 
and in fact states that the brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. The Appellee then restates many of the facts that are set forth in Appellant's brief, 
in some instances characterized differently but which more or less provide the same basic 
information. 
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11.. 
RESPONSE TO AND CLARIFICATION OF FACTUAL INFERENCES 
POII i 
IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO INFER THAT THE ASSIGNMENT IN THE MATTER 
INVOLVING PORTER WAS MORE THAN TO SECURE THE PAYMENT OF A DEBT 
Appi'lli'i1 iirjiH'S III ill iiiiiii iiiiiiili i i i i rc i an In ill iwiiii In ii|i| ill III Ill / 
finding that Appellant failed to p ^ >orter payments made by Granillos. >uld 
h«ji 't," llbei-ii in iiillll IIIIIIIK ii II I II it11 I 'm lei claiiiii-'iill lu be! owed urn and to 
wh i ch the cont rac t w a s p ledged ** e-- • iiiiiiili / I  his would be inconsistent with the typical 
collateral assignment ot. Porter's testimony did not claim the additional amounts 
under the contract but ui ny u i^ :jm at the end of the specified f i f l II II "ii CI I Vli" 1 Si- |i it-'i i l ly , 
Po'ter did ~~x ^induct ' " suggest he was claiming the 
c • - I 
in the final payment as he states at page Il II- Ill • ::: f tf ne trial transcript; 
F' ( i f I! li-K. [The /\ppe i ian t | expressed to me that he had a 
contract, he was in need of some money and 
was wanting to know if I'd be willing to advance 
him some money if he gave me the contract, but 
he was very adamant that he wanted to buy the 
contract back". 
Mr. Porter responded in the affirmative to the question from the State "Do you 
think at that point, when 1ic [Appellant] when you signed that agreement that he 
iritTiiilivii in in I II IIIIIII '[in 350.00 li.i i I* I ,l( mi (in in in h»)<' ill iriiMi n>h| miiiilt ii 
that he would not otherwise have entei ed it ito the contract." See Id at 14 1. Mr. 
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Porter then states that he did not want to keep the contract, he wanted the Appellant 
to pay the debt of $9,350.00. Under the circumstances, the question becomes 
whether or not it is reasonable for the jury to draw the inference that Appellee 
suggested in his response brief and in support of sufficient evidence for the crime of 
theft. Appellant suggests that while it is likely that the jury did draw such an 
inference the same is unreasonable and inappropriate in light of the testimony 
presented at trial establishing that the assignment was for security and not an 
absolute transfer of interest thus not requiring the transfer of the Granillo payments 
in addition to the payment of the debt in the amount of $9,350.00. 
POINT NUMBER 2: 
THE CIRCUMSTANCE IS ONE THAT ALSO GOES TO THE ISSUE OF INTENT 
TO DEFRAUD AND THERE IS NO SHOWING OF A SUFFICIENT 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ACT OF FORGERY AND INTENT TO 
DEFRAUD IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Because the act in the instant case involves Appellant's signing of Granillos' 
name to a contract that was being used for security in the payment of a debt, as 
opposed to the absolute assignment of a property interest in the contract, the mere 
act of signing another's name without permission does not necessarily constitute a 
forgery unless it is done with the intent to defraud Porter. While the document used 
as collateral may have been altered, the obligation to pay was realized, 
acknowledged and ultimately paid. In other words, the Appellant may have signed 
another's name without permission and he may have even possessed an intent to 
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defraud Granillos in doing so but the same is unrelated and completely separate 
from his commitment to repay the debt to Porter. Consequently, no fraud was 
committed. This is precisely what was found in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Ut. 
App. 1995) which involved a similar alteration of a document without permission but 
no intent to defraud. Appellant contends that it is not reasonable to infer that he 
intended to defraud Porter because Porter was only entitled to repayment of a debt 
which was acknowledged by Appellant and ultimately paid. Regarding the 
collateral, Porter was only entitled to further assurance or additional collateral which 
when offered by Appellant was refused by him. Since Porter was never entitled to 
any benefit beyond the repayment of the debt upon the terms agreed, any further 
interest realized by either party was purely incidental and not a matter of fraud. 
POINT NUMBER 3: 
APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
Appellant acknowledges that in a matter involving the sufficiency of 
evidence it is his responsibility to marshal the evidence. Appellant has attempted 
to do so. Appellant has set forth the facts that support the findings made by the jury 
verdict. Appellant has set forth the reasonable inferences drawn from those findings. 
Appellee has suggested inferences that were overlooked by Appellant. However, 
Appellant maintains that such inferences are not reasonable for the reasons set forth 
above, namely that they are not supported by the testimony and evidence presented 
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at trial. While Appellant contends that the concept of marshaling the evidence is 
often an elusive one, placing a burden on Appellant unmatched in any other 
argumentative context, the same should not be construed to also require the 
inclusion of those inferences that are not reasonable nor supported by the 
uncontroverted evidence in the case. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above and also for those reasons set 
forth in Appellant's brief, having replied to Appellee's brief, prays that relief be granted in 
reversing the jury verdict, or remanded ordering that judgment be entered consistent with 
Utah law, together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and 
proper. 
DATED this 2$ daV of 
J. BRYAjq JACKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant Cammack 
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